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IN SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : Priority No. 13 
CHARLES MONTGOMERY, : Supreme Court No. 920185 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to U.C.A. §78-2-2(5). Defendant/Appellant appeals from the 
Order of Affirmance from the Utah Court of Appeals dated March 
31, 1992. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issue presented on this appeal is whether or not 
an erroneous jury instruction is grounds for reversal 
regardless of whether or not an objection or lack thereof, to 
the instruction is on the court record. 
Standard for review is outlined in State v. Bullock, 
791 P.2d 155 at 158, (Utah 1989) defining the plain error 
test, when the record is void of an objection to a jury 
instruction. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution 
Declaration of Rights, Article I# Section 7 
Constitution of Utah 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE, NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE 
OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
Petitioner, Defendant/Appellant below, was convicted 
of attempted manslaughter on December 4, 1990, and was 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison, On appeal to the Utah 
Court of Appeals, and without any request from either 
Petitioner or Respondent, the Court of Appeals considered the 
appeal pursuant to Rule 31, U.R.A.P. From an Order of 
Affirmance ot the trial court's judgment denying a Motion for 
a New Trial and a Motion for Arrested Judgment, defendant 
petitioned this Court for Certiorari, which was granted on 
June 23, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1, Defendant was convicted of attempted 
manslaughter on December 4, 1990 and was sentenced to the Utah 
State Prison for an indeterminate term of 0 to 5 years. 
2. One of the jury instructions, Number 5, was 
aimed at instructing the jury on reasonable doubt. The trial 
court in formulating the jury instructions with the 
prosecution attorney, defendant's attorney and the court's own 
observations, stated in the record as contained in Addendum A. 
-2-
3» No formal objection to that instruction as 
formulated by the court is contained in the record by either 
the prosecutor, defense counsel or the court itself. 
4. Prior to sentencing and as indicated in the 
Statement of the Case, pre-sentencing motions were presented 
to the Court, which were denied, the principal motion 
contending that plain error had been committed entitling 
defendant to relief from the judgment of conviction based upon 
an erroneous reasonable doubt jury instruction, 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Jury Instruction No. 5 in which the court used the 
terminology "more weighty and important matters relating to 
your affairs, you have no reasonable doubt" was in error and 
contrary to the State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989) 
and State v. Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328 (Utah 1990). The giving 
of an instruction containing that language is contrary to Cage 
v. Louisiana, 498 US, 112 L Ed 2d 339, 111 S.Ct. 
ARGUMENT OF POINT ON APPEAL 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 5 REGARDING REASONABLE DOUBT WAS 
ERROR AS A MATTER OF LAW AND CANNOT BE WAIVED 
It is apparent to the writer, who was not involved in 
the trial of this case, that the trial court, the prosecutor 
and defense counsel were all unaware of State v. Pedersen, 
and Cage v. Louisiana, at the trial of this case. Addendum B 
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is the jury instruction which is the subject of the Petition 
for Certiorari. In State v. Pedersen# decided on December 13, 
1990, "more weighty and important" was found to be error. 
Moral certainty and other terms were found prejudicial in Cage 
v» Louisiana, decided November 13, 1990. 
The Attorney General's office has defended this appeal 
solely on the question of waiver by defense counsel by either 
failing to object and stating reasons for objecting to 
Instruction No. 5 or refraining from objecting to the trial 
court's own initiative in formulating the terminology of 
Instruction No. 5 on reasonable doubt. The Utah Court of 
Appeals stated in State v« Purdue, 813 P.2d 2101 (Utah App. 
1991) 
The Utah Supreme Court has emphasized that Rule 19(c) 
requires more than a general exception to the 
instructions. The rule "requires that the matter 
excepted to and the ground therefor be distinctly 
state." State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 594 (Utah 
1988). Where no grounds are apparent from the text of 
the instruction and no objection is stated, the 
objection is presumed waived. State v. Dumas, 721 
P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1986). The exception to" this 
general rule is that "[notwithstanding a party's 
failure to object, error may be assigned to 
instruction in order to avoid manifest injustice." 
Utah R.Crim.P. 19(c) 
This position is clearly affirmed in State v. Bullock, 
791 P.2d 155 (Utah 1989) pertaining to plain error. 
Retroactive application of changes in the law are to be 
considered by courts in determining the applicability of those 
changes to the case at hand. See State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 
1258 (Utah 1983). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's argument on appeal is clearly outlined in 
the Petition for Certorari and is again summarized in this 
brief. If any error existed at the trial court level 
regarding the propriety of the reasonable doubt jury 
instruction as given to the jury, the error was mutually 
indulged in by the trial court, the prosecution and defense 
counsel. It is clear that under State v. Pedersen, supra that 
"weighty and important" consideration by the jury in 
correlating what constitutes a reasonable doubt with their own 
personal life decisions is improper on its face. The 
defendant was deprived of and is still being deprived of his 
liberty by virtue of what is now perceived as clear error. 
Based on the error in Jury Instruction 5, defendant 
seeks a reversal of his conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <2^^day of July, 1992. 
McRAE & DeLAND 
ROBERT M. McRAE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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copies of the Brief of Petitioner to Mr. R. Paul Van Dam and 
Mr. David B. Thompson, Attorney General's Office, 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 84114 this "2—^day of September, 
1991. 
ROBERT M. McRAE 
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MR. WILLIAMS: IT'S THIS ONE. 
MR. SOUVALL: OKAY. GOT IT NOW. 
THE COURT: THEN LET'S ONLY COPY THOSE THAT WE 
DON'T ALREADY HAVE COPIES OF, SO LET'S NUMBER THEM AS WE GO 
ALONG. 
NUMBER 2: "YOU ARE INSTRUCTED THAT DEFENDANT HAS 
ENTERED A PLEA OF NOT GUILTY TO THE INFORMATION." 
MR. SOUVALL: NUMBER 3? 
THE COURT: NUMBER 2. 
THE COURT: NUMBER 3 WILL BE, THE FACT THAT THE 
DEFENDANT HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH A CRIME. NO. 4, THE DEFENDANT 
IS A COMPETENT WITNESS IN HIS OWN BEHALF. 
MR. SOUVALL: IT'S APPARENTLY BEEN LEFT OUT OF THE 
COPIER. 
THE COURT: THEN WE HAVE PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT. IT'S A TWO-PARAGRAPH ONE. IT'S THE ONE THAT GOES, 
"IT'S NOT ONE THAT IS NEARLY FANCIFUL OR IMAGINARY". IT'S THE 
MORE EXPANDED ONE THAT WE HAVE USED. 
MR. SOUVALL: THIS IS THE ONE THAT I OBJECTED TO ON 
THE ELLIFRITZ TRIAL BECAUSE IT HAS THE WORD "SUBSTANTIAL" IN 
IT. A REASONABLE DOUBT IS ONE THAT IS REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL. 
I THINK SUBSTANTIAL IS WAY TOO STRONG OF A WORD TO DESCRIBE A 
REASONABLE DOUBT. 
THE COURT: I DON'T. THE MORE I HAVE THOUGHT ABOUT 
IT THE MORE I THINK THAT IS PROBABLY THE BEST DESCRIPTION WE 
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CAN GIVE THEM. BUT I UNDERSTAND YOUR CONCERN. WHAT DO YOU 
SUGGEST AS AN ALTERNATIVE? 
MR. SOUVALL: DELETE THE SENTENCE. JUST, IT IS A 
DOUBT BASED UPON REASON AND ONE WHICH REASONABLE MEN AND WOMEN 
WOULD HAVE UPON A CONSIDERATION OF THE EVIDENCE. JUST DELETE 
THAT BEFORE THE SEMICOLON. 
THE COURT: YOU WOULD HAVE TO -SAY A DOUBT, 
REASONABLE DOUBT, AND IS A DOUBT BASED UPON...," 
MR. SOUVALL: YES. 
MR. WILLIAMS: I WILL NOT GO OVER THE SUBSTANTIAL, 
BUT I THINK I WOULD STILL WANT THE REAL LANGUAGE, A REASONABLE 
DOUBT IS ONE WHICH IS REAL AND IS BASED UPON REASON. 
THE COURT: REASONABLE DOUBT IS ONE WHICH IS REAL 
AND IS BASED UPON...OKAY, HARRY? 
MR. SOUVALL: THAT'S FINE. I WON'T OBJECT TO THAT. 
THE COURT: A REASONABLE DOUBT IS ONE WHICH IS REAL 
AND BASED UPON REASON AND ONE WHICH IS — 
MR. SOUVALL: WHAT INSTRUCTION NUMBER WAS THAT? 
THE COURT: 5. 
THE COURT: NUMBER 6 IS, "YOU SHOULD CONSIDER 
CAREFULLY ALL THE TESTIMONY...," NUMBER 7 IS, "YOU ARE 
INSTRUCTED THAT YOU ARE THE SOLE JUDGE OF THE FACTS OF 
THE CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESSES AND THE WEIGHT." 
NUMBER 8, STATEMENTS OF COUNSEL. NUMBER 9, "IF IN 
THESE INSTRUCTIONS ANY RULE DIRECTION OR IDEA...," 
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INSTRUCTION NUMBER w 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof 
that satisfies the mind and convinces the understanding of 
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. A 
reasonable doubt is not one that is merely possible, fanciful, 
or imaginary, because almost everything related to human 
affairs is open to some possible doubt. A reasonable doubt 
is one which is real and is based upon reason and one which 
reasonable men and women would have upon a consideration of 
all the evidence. It must arise from the evidence or lack of 
evidence in the case. 
If, after an impartial consideration and comparison of 
the evidence, you can honestly say that you are not satisfied 
of the Defendant's guilt, you have a reasonable doubt; but if 
after such impartial consideration and comparison of all the 
evidence you can truthfully say that you have an abiding 
conviction of Defendant's guilt such as you would be willing 
to act upon in the more weighty and important matters relating 
to your affairs, you have no reasonable doubt. 
r-iLfco 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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MAR311992 
T^Jpar/ r :\!ccf)an 
Cfterk o* \rt* Court 
Utah Couii ci Appaate 
Sta te of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Charles Montgomery, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 
Case No. 910284-CA 
Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Jackson (Rule 31). 
This case is before the court pursuant to Rule 31, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed. 
Dated this ^!_ day of March, 1992. 
Ji^ifhM!B i 11 inqs,JMql 
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